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Before this decade, contract law received little attention from economists
compared to other common law fields such as property and tort law. In 1979,
Kronman and Posner "were struck by the paucity of economic writings on
contracts."' Since that time, the situation has changed dramatically. The
development of economic methodologies appropriate for studying bargaining
and the strategic use of private information has led economists to take a
greater interest in the subject of contract law.
The articles in this issue are samples from the burgeoning field of the
economics of contract law. They demonstrate that lawyers and economists
can bring economic models to bear on quite specific issues of contract law to
offer normative guidance regarding the structure of efficient contract law.
The success of the symposium and the quality of the articles offer hope that
this field will continue to flourish.
The articles cover a fairly narrow range of contract law issues. The second
through sixth articles all address topics involving remedies. Two of these look
at the optimal remedies to be provided by contract law, and the other three
are concerned with remedies selected prospectively by the parties. This
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choice of topics reflects the balance of topics in the literature. 2 It is a popular
choice because the bargain that establishes the contract is multidimensional; it
is haunted by the specter of unforeseen contingencies that cannot be easily
modeled. In contrast, the decision to breach occurs after such contingencies
have been resolved. Breach, settlement, and litigation involve a manageable
number of variables that can be fitted into standard economic models of
bargaining. Hence, there is a tendency to truncate the contractual
relationship and examine it beginning from the point of breach.
There are four other articles in this issue. The first analyzes contract
modification and the hold-up game. It examines what sort of contract
modifications courts should enforce in the absence of consideration. Two
other articles discuss the application of economic analysis to contracts in
specific commercial settings: trade secret licenses and the formation of
physicians' group practices. The final article focuses on the impact of
discovery rules on settlement of litigation. The articles are described below in
the order of placement in this issue.
The Graham and Peirce 3 article is motivated by the venerable contract
case of Alaska Packers' Association v. Domenico.4 The case concerned a labor
contract modified by an employer under duress. The crew of a fishing vessel
demanded higher wages and threatened to quit after they were at sea and it
was impossible to find a replacement crew. 5 This type of contract
modification under duress has been labeled "the holdup game." The court
thwarted the attempted hold up by refusing to honor the modification on
grounds of lack of consideration. 6
A simple rule stating that no contract modifications will be upheld unless
supported by consideration has not proved suitable. A substantial literature
has arisen in law and economics pointing out that breach can sometimes be
justified because of adverse random events. The threat of breach in such
circumstances leads to efficient contract modification, which may be
unsupported by consideration.
The authors argue that contract law remedies are inadequate to deter the
hold-up problem completely. Incomplete deterrence is desirable, however,
since complete deterrence would have a chilling effect on legitimate contract
modifications motivated by unforeseen problems. In addition, the authors
demonstrate conditions under which the contract law requirement that
modifications must be equitable is efficient. Their argument is based on a
presumed equivalence between equitable modifications and modifications
2. See, e.g., Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, I J. LEGAL STUD. 277
(1972); Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39
(1984); Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q(J..ECON 121 (1984).
3. Graham & Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 9.
4. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
5. Id. at 101.
6. Id. at 102.

Page 1: Winter 1989]

FOREWORD

that, ex ante, the parties would have judged mutually advantageous responses
to certain contingencies.
Renegotiation and Specific Performance7 by Lewis, Perry, and Sappington,
promotes a greater role for specific performance than that envisioned by the
Uniform Commercial Code. Demonstrating conditions under which specific
performance is a more efficient remedy for contract breach than the award of
money damages, the article explores optimal breach 8 in a model in which the
seller's opportunity cost of supplying products to a buyer fluctuates after the
contract is signed. The buyer and seller initially select a fixed payment and
quantity of goods to exchange. If the seller's cost is unexpectedly low, the
parties may negotiate additional sales, and if cost is unexpectedly high, they
may negotiate a reduction in sales. If no adjustment can be negotiated, either
party may call for specific performance.
Lewis, Perry, and Sappington show that for a broad range of costs, no
adjustment occurs. In their model, only the seller observes the true
production cost, and the buyer is skeptical of the seller's claims that cost
changes necessitate renegotiation. Only when the departure of actual cost
from expected cost is extreme do the parties adjust the quantity to be
delivered.
It is commonplace in law and economics to suppose that efficient contracts
allocate residual property rights in a transaction to the party that can use the
property most efficiently if an unforeseen contingency arises. Given that
perspective, a typical provision in loan contracts securing the creditor's
position through the right to seize the asset if the borrower does not repay
appears anomalous. Surely in most cases the borrower is in a position to use
the property more efficiently than the creditor. In Default, Foreclosure, and
Strategic Renegotiation,9 Kahn and Huberman characterize the role of security
terms in loan contracts in assuring efficient adjustment to a borrower's
financial plight.
In their model, the borrower is an entrepreneur who uses the borrowed
funds to invest in a project. The value of the project depends both on the
effort of the entrepreneur and on random factors beyond anyone's control.
Both effort and random events are observed by the entrepreneur and the
creditor, but they cannot be verified in court. Thus, the parties cannot make
the level of effort contingent on the value of the project, although it would
promote efficiency if they could.
The security provision offers an opportunity to surmount this difficulty.
When the value of the project after investment is less than the sum borrowed,
the entrepreneur threatens to default. Since the asset is more valuable in the
hands of the entrepreneur, the creditor is willing to renegotiate the loan,
7.
Winter
8.
9.
Winter

Lewis, Perry & Sappington, Renegotiation and Specific Performance, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
1989, at 33.
See infra note I I and accompanying text.
Kahn & Huberman, Default, Foreclosure, and Strategic Renegotiation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
1989, at 49.
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indirectly making the payment contingent on the unverifiable state of the
random events. The authors show that this device is sufficient to induce an
efficient level of effort from the entrepreneur.
Recent work by Aghion and Bolton l0 raises concern that liquidated
damage clauses in long-term sales contracts may have an entry-deterring
effect. In The Design and Duration of Contracts: Strategic and Efficiency
Considerations,II Masten and Snyder challenge this view, arguing that such
contract terms have efficiency advantages that are rarely compromised by
anticompetitive effects. The notion of optimal breach is of fundamental
importance to both of these theories; thus a brief digression on optimal
breach follows.
When parties enter a long-term contract they are aware that unforeseen
developments may render performance by the seller too costly to complete.
Likewise, contingencies could eliminate all opportunities for the buyer to
make profitable use of the product or service to be purchased. In an ideal
world, the parties would plan for such events and explicitly list appropriate
responses in their contract. Bounded rationality' 2 and limits to the
effectiveness of courts diminish the possibility of achieving this ideal.
Consequently, random events can produce a situation in which breach is the
most efficient choice, in the sense of maximizing the sum of the buyer's and
seller's profit. The question of whether contracts and contract law provide
the proper incentives for breach is the question of optimal breach.
In the Masten and Snyder model, efficient liquidated damage clauses
simply replicate the expectation damage measure assuring optimal breach. In
the Aghion and Bolton model, liquidated damages in the case of buyer breach
are set in excess of expectation damages in order to diminish the bargaining
power of a third-party seller. The effect of the damage clause is to deter entry
by other firms into the market. Masten and Snyder argue that the conditions
necessary for the Aghion and Bolton result are unlikely to be satisfied.
Institutional as well as economic factors support Masten and Snyder's
contention. They point out that the liquidated damage schedule necessary to
achieve entry deterrence is apt to be labeled a penalty by the courts, leaving it
unenforceable. Furthermore, the possibility that one seller might subcontract
with the other or assign the contract to a third party circumvents the impact of
the damage clause. Finally, in the absence of entry barriers, the condition that
the potential entrant has bargaining power is not satisfied.
Leitzel's article, Reliance and Contract Breach, 13 notes the differences
between the traditional legal and economic treatments of reliance
Aghion & Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry,. 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987).
Masten & Snyder, The Design and Duration of Contracts: Strategic and Efficiency Considerations, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 63.
12. The term "bounded rationality" is used to designate rational choice that takes into account
the cognitive limitations of the decisionmaker-limitations of both knowledge and computational
capacity. I H. SIMON, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMics 266 J. Eatwell, M. Milgate
& P. Newman eds. 1987).
13. Leitzel, Reliance and Contract Breach, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 87.
10.
11.
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expenditures and their protection in the event of breach. Perhaps the most
substantial difference is that economic models often interpret the expectation
and reliance damage measures as protecting all reliance, whereas legal
treatments generally note that only reasonable reliance is protected.
Attempting to incorporate a reasonableness standard into an economic model
of reliance protection is not a straightforward procedure. There is a
circularity inherent in reasonableness standards: Courts protect the amount
of reliance that a reasonable party would select, but a reasonable party will
select the amount of reliance that the courts will protect.
Leitzel shows that in standard economic models of contracting, this
circularity can be avoided with an appropriate reinterpretation of the
expectation damage measure. He goes on to show that the appropriate
expectation damage measure assures both efficient reliance and efficient
breach.
Chapman and Meurer 14 examine the choice of remedies for breach of
warranty in sales contracts. They have noted a surprising prevalence of
replacement warranties over refund warranties. This prevalence is surprising
because a consumer could take a refund and purchase a replacement, whereas
converting a replacement into cash could be quite difficult. The standard
microeconomic argument is that the cash remedy is more efficient than the inkind remedy. The authors offer two explanations for the prevalence of
replacement remedies. First, the replacement warranty offers a means of
discriminating among customers who differ in terms of their ability to use the
product properly. Second, a replacement warranty encourages the buyer and
the seller to make efficient transaction-specific investments.
This article also explores the law concerning breach of warranty, and
argues that contracts calling for exclusive replacement remedies sometimes
cannot be taken at face value. A seller may breach the obligation to replace a
defective product, choosing to pay damages instead. In industrial contracts, a
seller may refuse to provide a replacement when this refusal is efficient
because of changed market conditions. In consumer markets, such breach is
not likely to be profitable because of a seller's concern about its reputation, so
consumers can take replacement provisions at face value.
In An Analysis of Discovery Rules, 15 Sobel pursues an issue in the economics
of civil procedure: how the rigor of discovery rules affects the probability that
a dispute will be settled out of court. He finds that liberal discovery rules
reduce the probability of trial, but warns that the rules may not lead to
"fairer" settlements. In this context, fairer settlements are those that would
have been reached if the parties were completely informed ab initio. Difficulty
arises because a party may settle before becoming informed in order to avoid
discovery costs.
14. Chapman & Meurer, Efficient Remedies for Breach of Warranty, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1989, at 107.
15. Sobel, An Analysis of Discovery Rules, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 133.
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The link between this work and the economics of contract law is not
readily apparent, but it is profound. The articles by Graham and Peirce, 6
Lewis, Perry, and Sappington,17 Masten and Snyder,1 8 and Chapman and
Meurer 19 all build models incorporating one similar feature. In each model, a
contingency arises leading a party to contemplate breach. The two parties
then attempt to negotiate a settlement. In all four models, at least one of the
parties holds private information relevant to the determination of an efficient
adjustment. This private information spawns inefficient adjustment and
possibly litigation.
The question arises as to why private information is featured so
prominently in these models. Why will liberal discovery rules not create a
world in which fully informed parties adjust optimally to contingencies?
Sobel's paper suggests that the cost of discovery undermines efficiency. And
his model points economists in a direction for further inquiry regarding this
issue.
A recurrent theme in the economics of contracts is how to draft contracts
that offer both protection against risk and productive incentives to the
parties. 20 A producer in isolation appropriates the full benefit of his or her
labor, but is also maximally exposed to risk. When agents pool their earnings,
their vulnerability to idiosyncratic risk is reduced, but their productive
incentives are attenuated.
Palay 2 l studies this trade-off in the case of physicians. A physician makes
an investment in very specialized human capital: a medical specialty, a
reputation for quality care, and a stock of patients. The value of this
investment is subject to idiosyncratic risk that the physician would like to
avoid.
Normal strategies of risk avoidance are not available to physicians.
Because of institutional and moral-hazard constraints, they cannot sell shares
in their practices. They cannot diversify into multiple specialties or
professions. But they can pool their revenues to avoid risk. Health
("HMO's") and independent physician
maintenance organizations
associations are means of achieving this goal.
While team production is effective in reducing risk to producers, it also
tempts them to shirk, invites bickering over sharing rules, and is vulnerable to
desertion. Palay argues that various social controls ease the shirking problem.
The problems of exit and profit sharing are solved by creating firm-specific
capital that is shared by the producers. For example, the reputation of an
16. Graham & Peirce, supra note 3.
17. Lewis, Perry & Sappington, supra note 7.
18. Masten & Snyder, supra note 11.
19. Chapman & Meurer, supra note 14.
20. See, e.g., Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELLJ. ECON. 74 (1979); Shavell, Risk
Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); Stiglitz,
Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 219 (1974).
21. Palay, Diversifying Physician Risk Through Contract, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at
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HMO is valuable to a physician only as long as he or she is associated with that
HMO.
Like the Masten and Snyder piece, the Note entitled Antitrust Restrictions on
Trade Secret Licensing: A Legal Review and Economic Analysis 2 2 explores
contractual terms that might either promote efficient exchange or advance
anticompetitive goals. Trade secret transfers can easily generate thorny
negotiations. The seller must convince the buyer that the property in
question is valuable. But describing a trade secret effectively transfers the
property. Trade secret law offers some relief from this dilemma by imposing
a duty on prospective licensees to maintain confidences arising from license
negotiations. Furthermore, problems are created by the need for the licensor
to provide technical advice on the implementation of the secret information,
by the need to bundle different trade secrets and patents into a single license,
and by the difficulty of defining the scope of a trade secret in a rapidly
developing field of technology.
All of these difficulties, which are unique to intellectual property licenses,
promote extensive long-term contractual relations between licensors and
licensees. The likelihood of unforeseen developments affecting such longterm relationships calls for ancillary terms designed to share risk efficiently
and adjust to change. However, courts must be vigilant against the abuse of
trade secret licenses by parties interested in achieving horizontal restraints in
an industry. The Note demonstrates that the twin goals of promoting efficient
diffusion of trade secrets and avoiding horizontal restraints to competition are
difficult to achieve, because similar license terms could achieve either
efficiency goals or anticompetitive restraints.

22. Note, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Secret Licensing: A Legal Review and Economic Analysis, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 183 (authored by Elizabeth Miller).

